



Impasse in the Congo: What Do the People Think?

Results from a National Public Opinion Poll

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CONGO RESEARCH GROUP | GROUPE D'ÉTUDE SUR LE CONGO

The Congo Research Group (CRG) is an independent, non-profit research project dedicated to understanding the violence that affects millions of Congolese. We carry out rigorous research on different aspects of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. All of our research is informed by deep historical and social knowledge of the problem at hand, and we often invest months of field research, speaking with hundreds of people to produce a report.

We are based at the Center on International Cooperation at New York University and we work in collaboration with the Centre d'études politiques at the University of Kinshasa. All of our publications, blogs and podcasts are available at www.congoresearchgroup.org and www.gecongo.org.

The **Bureau d'Études, de Recherches, et de Consulting International (BERCI)** was founded in Kinshasa in 1991. It is a limited liability company specializing in surveys and polling. Over the past twenty-six years, it had worked for the World Bank, the United Nations, international NGOs, the Congolese government, as well as for private companies.

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INTRODUCTION

There is a heated debate currently raging over the future of democracy in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. President Joseph Kabila is nearing the end of his second and last term in office, which was supposed to expire on December 19, 2016. According to most analysts, it will be impossible to hold elections before then. The government has concluded a deal with part of the opposition to delay elections until April 2018 and to forge a transitional government. Nonetheless, much of the opposition rejects this deal, and donors and civil society organizations have been deeply critical of what they perceive as an unconstitutional power grab. There have been repeated protests across the country, including most recently street protests on September 19 and 20, leading to the deaths of dozens in the capital Kinshasa, and authorities have clamped down harshly on civil liberties.

At the heart of this crisis are questions regarding the constitution, the electoral process, civil liberties, international involvement, armed conflict, and judicial accountability. The Congolese people are largely absent from these debates, although parties on all sides of the political divide, as well as foreign actors, invoke “the will of the people.” In partnership with the Bureau d’Études, de Recherches, et Consulting International (BERCI), the Congo Research Group (CRG) based at Center on International Cooperation at New York University has conducted a nationally representative political opinion poll across the country. Between May and September 2016, our researchers interviewed 7,545 people. This report summarizes our findings.

ELECTIONS

At the core of the survey was a series of questions that aimed to understand respondents’ attitudes toward elections. They were asked: “For whom would you vote if elections are held by the end of this year?”¹

Public opinion has tilted sharply against the current ruling coalition. Moise Katumbi, the affluent former governor of Katanga province who joined the opposition in 2015, had the greatest support (33%), followed by Etienne Tshisekedi (18%), President Joseph Kabila (7,8%), and Vital Kamerhe (7,5%). Put together, a total of 17,5% said they would vote for an individual who is currently in the ruling coalition. This suggests that Kabila’s support has suffered a collapse from the 48,9% he received in 2011—in some parts of the country the trend is even more dramatic, such as in his ethnic homeland of northern Katanga, where he obtained over 90% of the vote five years ago but would only get around 7% today.

This indicates that a majority of Congolese (55% of respondents) support candidates who are excluded from the agreement to delay elections and bring certain opposition parties into government that was finalized on October 18, 2016 in Kinshasa. Indeed, only roughly 25% would vote for the leaders who are part of that deal.

One of the most hotly debated questions in recent months has been the electoral calendar. The current register is based on the controversial registration exercise of 2011 that saw uneven and dubious registration rates in some provinces.³ In addition, the current register leaves out an estimated 7 million new voters and includes 1,6 million deceased.⁴ However, considering that there are probably around 40 million Congolese voters, even a seriously flawed voter register would not be able to bridge the gap between Kabila and Katumbi, which this poll suggests could lie around 10 million voters.

Katumbi’s entry into the race has led to a dramatic split within the opposition vote, which at the moment is eclipsed by the standoff with the ruling coalition. However, if elections did take place and political preferences remain the same, this suggests that, if elections are held, competition for the presidency would shift to become primarily between Katumbi and Tshisekedi.

FIGURE 1 | I WOULD VOTE FOR (CANDIDATE) IF ELECTIONS ARE HELD BY THE END OF 2016




FIGURE 2 | PREFERRED CANDIDATE BY PROVINCE (MAP)




FIGURE 3 | PREFERRED CANDIDATE BY PROVINCE (TOP FOUR)





FIGURE 4 | OTHER CANDIDATES. STRONGHOLDS



Political opinion is fragmented, with no candidate obtaining a majority, although that would not be necessary given the current one round, first-past-the-post electoral system. Together, nineteen other candidates obtained 21,3% support, while a relatively low number (12,1%) refuse to say whom they would vote for or simply do not know.

Some aspects of the results are surprising. Katumbi, who is from Katanga but has spent little of his life in other provinces, has broad support across the country, with a plurality of potential voters supporting him in sixteen of the twenty-six provinces. He is not only popular in the Swahili-speaking east, but also in the capital Kinshasa (22,8%), in the northern provinces of Equateur (72,2%) and Tshuapa (67%), in the central provinces of Lomami (30,6%) and Kasai-Oriental (28,1%), and in the western Kongo Central (22,5%). A BERCI poll in Kinshasa 2015 already highlighted this popularity, when he was seen as the most popular person in the capital.⁵


It is difficult to assess Kabila’s popularity, as he is constitutionally barred from seeking another term in office. However, the poll clearly shows his predicament. Despite his inability to run, he is by far the most popular member of his coalition. None of the people most commonly mentioned as potential successors among his allies—Aubin Minaku (0,7%), Evariste Boshab (0,8%), Olive Lembe (2,6%), and Matata Ponyo (1,8%)—would receive more than a few percentage of the vote in response to this question. Support for Kabila is strongest in his mother’s home province of Maniema, where he, the First Lady Olive Lembe and Prime Minister Matata Ponyo together would obtain 40,9% in a potential vote. He is also relatively popular in southern Katanga, but has surprisingly been eclipsed by Katumbi and Tshisekedi in northern Katanga, which is considered his ethnic homeland.⁶

The poll reveals a sophisticated electorate in which class, religion, and gender matter little in terms of determining political preferences. There is almost no difference in the socio-economic or gender composition of the support base for Katumbi, Kabila, and Tshisekedi, and only very slight fluctuations with regards to religion. Since religious leaders have taken dramatically different political positions, this suggests that political preferences are not much influenced by church and mosque leaders.⁷ This gives lie to the notion of naïve Congolese voters being manipulated by their leaders or driven by atavistic identities. The same can be said for the urban-rural divide: whether a voter is poorly-educated born-again male farmer, or a well-off Catholic woman living in a city apparently has little impact on whom they would vote for. The same holds for many other questions asked in this survey.

Ethnicity and geographic origin, however, play an ambiguous role. For example, while Tshisekedi has a strong showing among his Luba community and Kamerhe is the most popular candidate in his home province of Sud-Kivu, Kabila appears largely snubbed by his Lubakat ethnic group, and Katumbi is popular far beyond southern Katanga.

These results must be analyzed with some caution. First, only a few individuals have officially declared their candidacy to become president. More importantly, the poll was conducted over four months between May and October 2016, an extremely tumultuous period during which Moise Katumbi left the country to go into exile, Etienne Tshisekedi returned home after years of medical treatment abroad, and Vital Kamerhe broke with most of the opposition to accept controversial negotiations with the government. All of these factors could have shaped political opinion. The provinces that we polled later during the survey—Equateur, Tshuapa, Haut-Uele, Bas-Uele, Ituri, Tshopo, Mongala, Sud-Ubanga, and Nord-Ubangi—saw slightly stronger showings for both Kamerhe and Katumbi than the rest of the country, which could be either due to national events or local particularities.⁸ The poll concluded before the end of the national dialogue on October 18, 2016.

FIGURE 5 | THE IMPORTANCE OF DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS IN DETERMINING SUPPORT FOR CANDIDATES




Also, support for a candidate can mean many things. It is plausible, for example, that respondents in the north and the east of the country, where Tshisekedi and Leon Kengo wa Dondo won most of the votes in 2011, switched their sympathies to Katumbi not due to a deep attachment to the candidate but because they think that the rich and successful former governor has the best chance at beating Kabila. That could also explain why support for Tshisekedi has slipped in Nord-Kivu (from 21% in the 2011 election to 5% in this poll) and Kongo Central (from 74% to 18%) in Katumbi’s favor. Similar anti-incumbent sentiment motivated voters in 2006.

In other words, the poll takes an accurate snapshot of political opinion at a particular point in time, but cannot determine the reasons behind these levels of support or the depth or intensity of support. It is clear, however, that the electorate is less moved by unchanging identities or for whom their local leaders tell them to vote, but by a dynamic appreciation of the behavior of those governing them.

TRUST IN ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION


Overall, respondents' faith in the democratic process is modest, and their trust in the electoral commission and its president has wavered. Seventy-two percent said they think "voting allows people to participate in decision-making in our country," but 41,3%, in response to a different question, said "people like me cannot influence decisions taken by the government." Only 46,5% said they trust the electoral commission to hold free and fair elections, and a plurality of people (38,3%) said they had a poor opinion of Corneille Nangaa, the president of the election commission.⁹

FIGURE 6 | "VOTING GIVES PEOPLE THE CHANCE TO PARTICIPATE IN DECISION MAKING IN OUR COUNTRY"



Nonetheless, 72,7% said they intended to vote.¹⁰ If they follow through on their intentions, that would produce a considerably higher turnout than the 58,8% who voted in the 2011 elections, and would be similar to the 70,5% turnout for the 2006 elections.

FIGURE 7 | TRUST IN CENI BY PROVINCE




There have been numerous proposals regarding the sequence of the elections. Members of the ruling coalition have said on several occasions that they would prefer local elections—which were mandated by the 2006 constitution but have never been held to be held—first, an opinion shared by the head of the election commission. However, the opposition fears that this would delay the more important presidential elections. Respondents sided clearly with the opposition: 65,8% said national parliamentary and presidential elections should be held first, even if that means delaying local elections. Twelve percent said local elections should be held first, and 22% said it is up to the government to decide.¹¹

CHANGING THE CONSTITUTION

Respondents were asked whether they were in favor of a constitutional revision that would allow Kabila to have another term in office. While the government has never explicitly requested such a reform, numerous officials in the ruling party have tabled the idea. The answer was clear: only 15.8% are in favor of such a change to the constitution.¹² That number maps neatly onto the number of people expressing support for a candidate from the ruling coalition (17,5%). Most respondents who were undecided about whom to vote for—or who did not want to share their preference—appear to oppose changing the constitution.

There is little variation with respect to this question in terms of class, religion, or the rural-urban divide. As with support for candidates, one important factor influencing opinions is geographic: the provinces of Sankuru (56%), Lualaba (45,6%), and Haut-Katanga (28,8%) were much more

favorable to a constitutional revision, which again corresponds to high levels of support there for President Kabila in general.¹³




WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN ON DECEMBER 20, 2016?

On May 11, 2016 the constitutional court issued a decision stating that if elections are not held on time, President Joseph Kabila could stay in power until elections are organized. The opposition has denounced this decision and many of its members are calling for Kabila to step down at the end of 2016.

We addressed this controversial decision. Respondents were asked whether Kabila should step down at the end of 2016, when his constitutional term expires, or whether he could stay on until elections are held.¹⁴

FIGURE 8 | KABILA SHOULD LEAVE OFFICE ON DECEMBER 20, 2016



Again, the answer was clear: 74,3% said that President Kabila should leave office at the end of 2016. The same differences between the provinces could be observed, with some nuances. For example, respondents in Maniema are relatively (53,8%) tolerant of Joseph Kabila staying on until elections are held, but do not want to see the constitution changed to allow him to stay for a third term (10,8%).

DIALOGUE POLITIQUE

In November 2015, President Joseph Kabila announced the holding of a political dialogue between the ruling coalition, the opposition, and civil society to discuss the electoral process. When the dialogue finally began on September 1, 2016, it had become the forum in which the government intended to obtain consensus over delaying elections and setting up a transitional government to govern the country until the polls could take place.

The dialogue divided the political opposition: the Catholic Church, some civil society organizations and several smaller political parties, including Vital Kamerhe’s UNC, decided initially to participate. Most of the opposition, including Etienne Tshisekedi’s UDPS and the G7 coalition close to Moise Katumbi, boycotted the negotiations. On October 18, 2016 a deal was approved between part of the opposition led by Kamerhe and the government to hold elections in April 2018 and to allow the opposition to have the prime ministry.

The poll was conducted before this agreement and—in most of the country—before the dialogue had begun. Fifty-eight percent said that the opposition and civil society should participate in such a dialogue “to calm the political climate and find solutions to the nation’s problems,” while 24,1% did not agree with the statement. This statement itself is somewhat open to interpretation—even Tshisekedi and Katumbi insist they want a dialogue, but they insist on certain conditions being met before they come to the table.¹⁵

Few, however, appear to have much faith in the process that has played itself out in Kinshasa. Only 25,1% trust the facilitator named by the African Union for the dialogue, Edem Kodjo, who has been accused of political bias by the opposition. Forty-four percent do not trust him, while 25,9% do not know.¹⁶


It is difficult to poll a moving target, and the national conversation surrounding the dialogue shifted during the four-month period it took us to conduct the poll. Nonetheless, the opinions expressed have remained relatively consistent between May and September 2016.

POLITICAL PREFERENCES

What are people’s priorities when making decisions regarding elections? Democracy is still young in the Congo—there have been two major rounds of voting, one in 2006 and one in 2011. In 2006, voters went to the polls twice to vote for a president and national and provincial legislators. Governors and senators were then elected indirectly by provincial members of parliament.


The most important factor for respondents was the probity of the candidate.¹⁷ When asked which three criteria influenced their choice most, 43,4% percent said it was important that the candidate is not corrupt and 27,2% said he should “care about people like me.” Personality and charisma, however, were also critical (35,5%), and a considerable number of people openly said they wanted a candidate who could distribute money to the population (13%), who had a lot of power (21,9%), who is from the same ethnic group (7,5%) or who could help the respondents’ family or ethnic group (11%). Motivations, in other words, are complex, and voters are sometimes driven by contradictory impulses.

FIGURE 9 | WHAT IS THE FACTOR THAT MOST INFLUENCES YOUR CHOICE FOR A CANDIDATE? [RESPONDENTS COULD CHOOSE MORE THAN ONE]



A popular Congolese saying is: “You cannot eat elections,” and it is common political fare in certain political circles to suggest that the population prioritizes development and security over elections. We asked this question: “The country is facing numerous challenges, including poverty, a complicated electoral process, and violent conflict.” Respondents then said whether security and development should be prioritized over elections, go hand in hand, or elections are more important. The results were clear: most respondents (46,7%) felt all three are linked and should be worked on at the same time, 39,1% said elections were more important than any other consideration, and only 14% said security and development are a greater priority than elections. Even provinces with endemic violence, such as Sud-Kivu (43%), and that are very poor, such as Mai-Ndombe (72,4%) saw elections as the absolute priority. For a population struggling to make ends meet, and facing pervasive insecurity, these results were remarkable.

FIGURE 10 SHOULD WE PRIORITIZE ELECTIONS OR SECURITY AND DEVELOPMENT?




POLITICAL PROTEST AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY

There is a tradition of peaceful political protest in the Congo going back decades. However, it has been difficult for the opposition and civil society to mobilize in the face of repression, and the government has accused protestors of being violent and unruly.

In order to get a gauge of how many people have participated in protest, we asked respondents whether they had participated in a protest march, a strike, or a demonstration over the past five years—7,6% said they had.¹⁸ While that figure seems modest, it still suggests that several million people may have participated in some form of social contestation.

Reporting on events that may have happened years ago can often produce inaccuracies or prompt respondents to filter past experiences through their present feelings. Which is why the following result is arguably more interesting. We asked the same people whether they would participate in a demonstration if elections are either rigged or delayed or both—48,5% said they would, a very large increase.¹⁹

FIGURE 11 | I HAVE PARTICIPATED IN A PROTEST IN THE PAST 5 YEARS



This is not to say that all of those people would actually participate in a protest. Many factors influence such a decision: the possibility of violence and repression, the economic consequences of not working that day, and the decisions of friends and family, to name just a few. However, it gives an idea of people’s attitudes toward popular protest.

We also asked about the acceptability of popular contestation. “Since 2015, several groups of youths have been arrested in Kinshasa and Goma for having participated or planned protests or demonstrations or ‘ville mortes’ against the government.” Fifty-seven percent of respondents said those youths are expressing their rights of freedom of expression and assembly, 16% said these types of activities could create problems and destabilize the country; 27,2% said they did not know enough about the situation. There was little variation due to gender, class, religion, education, or the urban-rural divide.


The poll also reveals very high levels of political and organizational activity, an indication of social capital, especially in some parts of the country. Twenty-one percent of people in Kinshasa said they had participated in a political party activity, and levels in Maniema (36,5%), the former Province Orientale (31,4%) and the former Kasais (around 25%) were even higher. Given the low rates of formal employment, reports of participation in union activities (*syndicats*) was remarkably high

in the former Province Orientale (22,4%), Sud-Kivu (14,5%), and the Kasais (around 15%), although *syndicat* can sometimes refer to other non-governmental organizations.²⁰

GENDER

Women face persistent discrimination in Congolese society and are disproportionately affected by violence and poverty. The constitution requires the government to work towards gender parity in national institutions, but the legislature has not passed laws to implement this. In the 2007-2011 legislature, only 8% of parliamentarians and 11% of cabinet ministers were women.

FIGURE 12 | ONE SHOULD ENSURE THAT HALF OF CANDIDATES FOR PUBLIC OFFICE ARE WOMEN




The poll asked several questions aiming at understanding the perception of a woman’s role in society. Congolese in general are eager to promote a greater role for women: 80,7% said women should run for political office (8,9% said they should not), 64,6% of those who agreed said that efforts should be made to guarantee that half of candidates for political office are women, and 60,6% of all respondents said women should be able to be president of the country.²¹

Generally, the gender of respondents did not matter much in political preferences, although in general women were more likely to respond with “I don’t know” to all questions of a political nature. Nonetheless, women were almost as likely as men to say they would protest in case of electoral irregularities, and in demanding justice for war crimes.

SECURITY

Although the country is officially in a post-conflict period, and the last five years saw the defeat of the M23 rebellion, most Congolese are downbeat about security. Thirty-seven percent of respondents said that security had gotten worse in the past five years, while 14.9% said it had improved (38% said it had remained the same).²²


FIGURE 13 | I FEEL SAFER TODAY THAN 5 YEARS AGO



Unsurprisingly, this criticism was very pronounced in Nord-Kivu, where 53,1% felt security had gotten worse. Surprisingly, high levels of negative responses were also present in provinces with no military conflict: Mai-Ndombe (72,3%), Nord-Ubangi (61%), Kasai-Oriental (50,7%), and Kwango (57,7%). In contrast, in conflict-ridden Sud-Kivu on balance people felt that security was improving, a feeling much more widespread in Maniema. Of course, the question evaluated relative improvements and not absolute levels of insecurity.

Perceptions of insecurity were higher in urban areas, where 43,5% of respondents said they felt unsafe walking alone at night, compared with 32,1% in rural areas, which could be an indication of the rise of crime in cities.

FIGURE 14 | DO YOU FEEL UNSAFE WALKING IN YOUR NEIGHBORHOOD OR VILLAGE?



Few felt that the performance of the army (24%) or police (19,6%) had improved in the past years. Distrust of the army (57,2%) and of the police (64,1%) was greater than almost in any other government institution.

FIGURE 15 | THE ARMY HAS BECOME BETTER AT SECURING PEOPLE AND THEIR BELONGINGS OVER THE PAST 5 YEARS






FIGURE 16 | THE POLICE HAS BECOME BETTER AT SECURING PEOPLE AND THEIR BELONGINGS IN THE PAST 5 YEARS



In the wake of the peace process, the police was deemed by many donors to be more susceptible to reform, as it was less politicized. In this regard, the poll is sobering. More Congolese (26%) thought the police was the main group responsible for insecurity in their community than they did the army (14%). Nationwide, respondents thought armed groups were the main problem (40,2%), although this view was far more widespread in the conflict-affected provinces than in places like Kinshasa, Mai-Ndombe and Kwango where the police were seen as the principle cause of insecurity, or in Haut-Katanga and Maniema, where people cited the FARDC.


FIGURE 17 | WHO IS MOST RESPONSIBLE FOR INSECURITY IN YOUR COMMUNITY?



Nonetheless, when people were asked to whom they would go for help in case of a crime, most (49,1%) said the police, although that figure was considerable lower in Ituri (36,3%), Sud-Kivu (35%), and Nord-Kivu (35,1%), provinces where donors have supported police reform programs. When asked to whom people would turn in case of an ethnic conflict in the community, most (55,4%) said they would go to customary chiefs, even though they have no legal competence in these matters and almost no state resources to address these problems.


When asked how to deal with armed groups, respondents clearly felt that the time for negotiations was over. After multiple army integration exercises since 2003, which arguably rewarded armed mobilization with positions and status, the population said that it was time to prioritize military force. Forty-seven percent said armed groups should be disarmed by force—a sentiment prominent in the conflict-affected areas of the East—although 33% were favorable to a demobilization program.

FIGURE 18 | WHAT IS THE BEST WAY OF DEALING WITH CONGOLESE ARMED GROUPS?



The peace process between 1999 and 2006 propelled many former belligerents into national politics, and since then many politicians have been accused of collaborating with armed groups for personal gain or for bolstering their popularity. We evaluated this phenomenon by asking respondents which statement they agreed with: “Sometimes it is necessary to create an armed group to protect the local population,” and “Armed groups always end up abusing the population and should never be supported.” Fifty-three percent agreed with the latter proposition, while 14,8% agreed with the former, a high figure considering we were asking respondents about whether they support something illegal. A similar percentage of respondents (15,1%) said they would vote for a politician who supported armed groups. If these questions are seen as an indicator of radicalism and the acceptability of armed violence as a political instrument, then these sentiments are particularly high in the north and south of the country—in Bas-Uele, Nord-Ubangi, Lualaba, and Haut-Katanga.

FIGURE 19 | I WOULD VOTE FOR A POLITICIAN WHO SUPPORTS AN ARMED GROUP, SAYING HE WANTS TO PROTECT THE COMMUNITY



There also appears to have been changes to popular perceptions of the drivers of conflict. While there has been little polling conducted on this issue, notions that the conflict was being driven by Rwanda and Uganda in complicity with the United States have been widespread in the past. The blame appears to be shifting toward the Congolese government and the greed of private individuals. In response to the question, “Which of the following elements do you think is the most important cause of conflict in the eastern Congo today?” 32,6% blamed corrupt institutions and a weak army. Few blamed western interference (7,1%) or Rwandan aggression (10,8%), although many still think that minerals are the main driver of violence (21,1%). Interestingly, in Sud-Kivu, one of the most conflict affected provinces, this focus on state weakness and corruption was even more pronounced.

JUSTICE

We asked respondents a variety of questions regarding the justice sector, ranging from their everyday experiences to high-level politics. Overall, respondents expressed a deep distrust in the judiciary, while at the same time demanding greater accountability for war crimes.

Only 19,9% thought the justice system was independent, 23,1% thought Congolese were equal in front of the law, and 38,2% thought the justice system was accessible for all Congolese. A full 27,2% of respondents said they or a member of their family had been victims of an arbitrary arrest at some point—a deeply troubling figure. And of all government institutions, respondents felt that only the police was more corrupt than the courts (54,2% thought courts are very corrupt).

Most war crimes committed during the various Congo wars have not been prosecuted in international or national tribunals, and various Congolese and international organizations have pushed for the creation of a war crimes tribunal for the Congo. The government proposed a law to this effect in 2011, but it was rejected by parliament. We asked respondents how they felt about the creation of a tribunal to judge war crimes; 76,4% were in favor. Of those, 71,4% approved of foreign judges sitting on the tribunal.²⁴

FIGURE 20 | IN FAVOR OF CREATING A CONGOLESE TRIBUNAL TO JUDGE WAR CRIMES






FIGURE 21 | IN FAVOR OF FOREIGN JUDGES SITTING ON A WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL (BY PROVINCE)



Respondents, however, had mixed views of international justice, especially the prosecution of former vice-president Jean-Pierre Bemba for crimes committed by his troops in the Central African Republic. Bemba was sentenced to 18 years in prison in March 2016, just before this poll was launched. Only 33,2% thought the judgment was just, and in parts of the north, where Bemba is from, rates were as low as 3,3 in Mongala and 12,8% in Nord-Ubangi.

FIGURE 22 | I THINK THE VERDICT AGAINST JEAN-PIERRE BEMBA WAS FAIR




THE ECONOMY

Overall, when asked what the top priority for the government should be, 29,9% of respondents said the economy, a plurality of responses.²⁵ Until 2015, the Congolese economy had enjoyed a decade during which it grew at an average of around 6 percent each year, one of the highest growth rates in the world. Copper production grew from almost nothing in 2000 to over a million tons in 2015, making the country the largest producer in Africa and one of the largest in the world. Despite the vicissitudes of the commodity markets, production has also increased dramatically in tin, tantalum and gold production. Since the unification of the country in 2003, it has also seen hundreds of millions of dollars in investment in the telecommunications and banking sectors.


However, there has been little broad-based growth in the agricultural sector, in which most of the population is employed. There has also been a marked economic downturn since 2015 due to lower commodity prices. Since the beginning of 2016, the franc has appreciated around 25% against the US dollars.

FIGURE 23 | MY ECONOMIC SITUATION IS BETTER THAN IT WAS 5 YEARS AGO



These factors may explain pessimism surrounding the economy; 38% of respondents said they were worse off financially than five years ago and only 13,6% said they were better off, while 37,6% said nothing had changed. Several factors were correlated with responses: Geography, political preferences, and income levels. Twenty-one percent of those earning more than \$1,000 a year said they felt better off, while 13,8% of those earning less than \$400 annually said they were better off, confirming that growth has been unevenly spread. Strikingly, respondents from the conflict-ridden East was much more optimistic about their economic situation than those from the West, suggesting either that those provinces have been neglected or simply have less economic potential. Provinces where President Kabila is popular also present greater economic confidence: Sankuru (51,6%) and Maniema (50%), although some of these provinces are the same where there has been substantial mining investment, such as Lualaba (36,7%) and Haut-Katanga (30,5%), so it is difficult to ascertain what is driving the response rates.

FIGURE 24 | I KNOW SOMEONE WHO HAS BEEN AFFECTED BY BANCARSATION



We also asked about two flagship economic projects that the government initiated: *bancarisation*, or the push to pay all state employees through bank accounts; and a large state-sponsored agriculture project in Bukanga Lonzo, in Kwango province, that was inaugurated in 2014. Over 70% of respondents approve of *bancarisation*, which was launched in 2011, and 48,7% said they had been personally affected or knew someone who had. This not only shows the popularity of this initiative, but also the large number of people employed in the public sector. Bukanga Lonzo is perceived as less of a success: 23,9% said it is a good, well-executed initiative, 30,3% said it is a good initiative but poorly executed, and 36,3% said they had never heard of it or did not have an opinion.²⁶

NATIONALISM AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

Congolese have a reputation for a strong sense of national pride and identity. And yet, the country has seen secessionist movements in Katanga in the 1960s and 1970s, and ethnic affiliation is often cited as an influence in voting patterns.


The poll tested these notions of identity and suggests that national identity is far more important than ethnicity, even in rural areas. As we could see above in electoral support for various candidates, the four main figures on the national stage—Katumbi, Kabila, Tshisekedi, and

Kamerhe—all have high levels of support in their ethnic heartlands. However, elsewhere in the country, people chose to vote for them instead of throwing their weight behind a politician from their community, another indication of strategic, sophisticated voting behavior. For example, Katumbi is the most popular candidate in Equateur, Haut-Uele, Bas-Uele, Sud-Ubangi, Kwango, Kwilu, Tshopo, and Tshuapa, even though he has no ethnic or personal affinities with these places.

We also asked: “Imagine you had to choose between being Congolese or member of your ethnic group?” Respondents could then choose between different answers; 58,4% said they felt only Congolese or more Congolese than member of their ethnic group. An additional 25% felt equally Congolese and member of their ethnic group, and only 8,7% felt identified more or only with their ethnic group. Feelings of ethnic attachment were not much higher in rural areas, although there was geographic variation. In Lualaba, where Katangan secessionism still strikes a chord among the Lunda people, 28,6% said they felt more or only member of their ethnic group. That figure was also higher in areas populated by Luba, such as Lomami (19,6%) and Kasai-Central (12,4%).

Despite all of the problems facing the Congo, respondents largely rejected emigrating. Asked whether they would leave the country if they had the opportunity to do so, 57.6% said no (34,3% said yes).


FIGURE 25 | I IDENTIFY MYSELF AS ONLY CONGOLESE OR MORE CONGOLESE THAN MY ETHNIC GROUP



While most respondents did not place much emphasis on ethnicity, they still think it is a deep problem in society. Seventy-five percent feel that tribalism is either the main cause (25,8%) or one of many causes (49,2%) of conflict in the country. A plurality of people (32,3%) thinks that public sector nominations are never free of different kinds of discrimination.


Identity politics are particularly prominent when it comes to the Kinyarwanda-speaking populations of Nord-Kivu and Sud-Kivu. In Nord-Kivu, Congolese Hutu and Tutsi have been present since pre-colonial times, and were joined by large waves of Rwandan immigrants during the 1930s-1950s. In Sud-Kivu, there is a sizeable population of Rundi—who are descendants of immigrants from Burundi—in the Ruzizi Plain, as well as a population of Banyamulenge—descendants of Tutsi and Hutu pastoralists who have been there at least since the 19th century—in the highlands of Mwenga, Uvira, and Fizi territories. Armed groups, especially those supported by Rwanda, have recruited heavily from these groups, exacerbating tensions with other communities.

FIGURE 26 | I THINK BANYAMULENGE ARE CONGOLESE



Despite their deep historical roots, most respondents did not think members of these communities are Congolese. Only 23,2% felt that Banyamulenge are Congolese, while 27,1% said there are Congolese Hutu and 23,8% said there are Congolese Tutsi.²⁷ Responses varied considerably across the provinces. Acceptance for these communities was slightly higher in Nord-Kivu, although extremely low in Sud-Kivu.²⁸


FIGURE 27 | THERE ARE TUTSI WHO ARE CONGOLESE



SUPPORT OF VARIOUS LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT


Even though most Congolese appear to want a change of government, their opinions of the current government are not too unfavorable. When asked whether they support the actions of various levels of government, around 44% said they approved (either a little or strongly) of President Kabila, Prime Minister Matata Ponyo and the government as a whole, while approval of Senate President Kengo wa Dondo was slightly higher (49,4%) and that of National Assembly President Aubin Minaku was lower (38,4%).

FIGURE 28 | I SUPPORT THE WORK DONE BY (NAME OF OFFICIAL)




More striking, however, was that respondents in general support local institutions more than national ones, even though those institutions only manage a minute share of national revenues.²⁹ A *chef de chefferie* for example, the most important level of customary chief, has an average approval rating of 64,1%, while a *chef de village*, the lowest administrative authority, gets 70%. Similar differences showed up when we asked whether respondents felt their interests were looked after, albeit in general people are disappointed with the state—24,8% said they were at the local level, while only 13,4% said so at the national level. Combined with the relatively high approval rating, this reveals the low expectations people have of government.

FIGURE 29 | I AM IN FAVOR OF DÉCOUPAGE



This preference for local authorities also showed up in questions regarding decentralization. The 2006 constitution calls for a decentralization of power and revenues, creating 26 provinces out of 11 and mandating 40% of national revenues to be managed at the provincial and local levels. While a large part of these reforms have yet to be undertaken, in 2015 the government went about the creation of new provinces, the so-called *découpage*. Countrywide, 55,8% of respondents approved of the process.³⁰ It was, however, unclear what drives the large variation between provinces. In one of the most resource-rich new provinces, Haut-Katanga, which stands to benefit from *découpage*, only 46,7% approved of the process, although that could be because it effectively undermined the position of the popular former governor Moïse Katumbi. In contrast, approval ratings were very high in provinces with very weak revenue bases such as Mongala (83,3%) and Kwango (81,1%).

FIGURE 30 | IN GENERAL, I HAVE A GOOD OPINION OF (NAME OF OPPOSITION LEADER)




The poll also tried to assess popular opinion of opposition leaders. Surprisingly, given the support of opposition candidates, some of these leaders were not seen more favorably than those in power today. Since these individuals do not hold public office, the question was slightly different: “In general, what is your opinion of the following individuals?” Martin Fayulu and Mwando Simba fell within the confidence interval (+/-3%) AS President Kabila. However, much higher levels of favorability were reported for Vital Kamerhe (56,9%), Etienne Tshisekedi (65,3%) and Moise Katumbi (85,8%).

MONUSCO

MONUSCO and its predecessor MONUC (1999-2010) have a checkered reputation in the Congo. While MONUC helped broker and implement a peace deal that unified the country, and led to its first democratic elections in forty years, the peacekeeping missions have also been dogged by sexual abuse scandals and by accusations that they have not taken sufficiently aggressive action to protect civilians.


General public opinion is mixed regarding MONUSCO: 55,1% think the peacekeepers should stay and 29,4% think they should leave.³¹ But MONUSCO is especially unpopular in the very areas where it has deployed most of its troops: in Nord-Kivu (56,7%), Sud-Kivu (50,2%) and Ituri (45,2%) a preponderance of respondents said MONUSCO should leave. An alarming high number of Congolese also felt that the peacekeeping mission was very corrupt (17,4%) a figure that rose to around 24% for the conflict-affected provinces. Only 36% felt it was not at all corrupt.

FIGURE 31 | SHOULD MONUSCO STAY, LEAVE, OR DOWNSIZE?



Responses were similar when people were asked whether MONUSCO protects civilians, the core imperative of its current mandate. Nationwide 63% say it does, but those figures were much lower in Nord-Kivu (30,2%), Sud-Kivu (39,2%) and Ituri (40,4%).³²

FIGURE 32 | MONUSCO DOES A GOOD JOB PROTECTING CIVILIANS



MONUSCO has also been criticized for being too reactive in dealing with security threats, and on insisting on partnering with the Congolese army in military operations. Around 63% of respondents felt peacekeepers should take unilateral action against armed groups, a figure that was higher in Sud-Kivu (71,7%) but lower in Nord-Kivu (54,1%).³³


FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT

The Congo has received billions in foreign aid in recent years and hosts the world’s largest peacekeeping mission. Relations between the government and donors have become increasingly tense in recent years. The United States has imposed sanctions against high-ranking security officials, and other donors have harshly criticized the government over human rights abuses and delays in the electoral calendar.

Despite government arguments that donors are meddling in their sovereign affairs, Congolese broadly seem to welcome foreign involvement in political affairs. Sixty-seven percent said foreign diplomats should tell the government to respect the constitution, while 32,8% said foreign diplomats should not get involved in Congolese affairs.


When people were asked which countries played a positive role in the Congo, the United States—which has taken the most aggressive stance toward the government in the current electoral impasse—came first with 73,3%, followed by France (71,1%), Belgium (67,4%), China (65,4%) and the United Kingdom (65,1%). Countries in the region were perceived less favorably. While 61,4% thought South Africa was playing a positive role, the figures were lower for Angola (49,5%), the Republic of Congo (35,7%), Uganda (15,4%), and Rwanda (10,7%).

FIGURE 33 | I THINK (NAME OF COUNTRY) PLAYS A POSITIVE ROLE IN THE DR CONGO TODAY




When it comes to development aid and foreign investments, the picture is bleaker. Many Congolese feel that they do not benefit from foreign aid, private sector investments or humanitarian work. We asked whether the Congo would be better off without foreign aid—31,3% said yes. Similarly high levels said the country would fare better without international NGOs (33,4%) and foreign investment (31%). Surprisingly, these responses are even higher in some of the provinces most affected. For example, in Nord-Kivu, which sees most activity by international NGOs, 47,2% said they would be better off without them. In Lualaba, the heart of industrial mining in the Congo, 34,3% said they would be better off without foreign investment.³⁴

FIGURE 34 | THE CONGO WOULD BE BETTER OFF WITHOUT [FORM OF FOREIGN INVOLVEMENT]



When asked about specific initiatives, responses are also mixed. In 2007, the Congolese government signed a \$6 billion infrastructure-for-minerals deal with the Chinese government, and Chinese companies have invested \$9,6 billion in mining and hydropower in the Congo since 2012. While progress has been slow in the implementation of the deal, a slight plurality of respondents (39,1% versus 36,9%) thought it was a good idea.

FIGURE 35 | THE CHINESE INFRASTRUCTURE FOR MINERALS DEALS IS A GOOD IDEA



Opinions were more downbeat regarding an American law, included in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection act of 2010, aimed at preventing armed groups from profiting from conflict minerals. Many respondents did not know enough about the initiative, but an overwhelming plurality (36%) thought the law had a negative impact, a figure that was much higher in Sud-Kivu, one of provinces most affected by the law, where 56,9% thought it had a negative impact.

METHODOLOGY AND QUALITY CONTROL

This poll consisted of 7,545 face-to-face interviews with adults over the age of 18 at their place of residence. The interview sites were selected randomly to produce a nationally representative sample.³⁵ Interviews were translated into the four national languages (Kikongo, Lingala, Swahili, and Tshiluba). The response rate was 97,5%, suggesting an extremely open population. A more detailed description of our methodology is available at www.congoresearchgroup.org.

The surveys were conducted on electronic tablets using Open Data Kit (ODK) and uploaded every few days to a cloud-based server hosted by Ona.io. Quality assurance was conducted in real-time as the surveys were uploaded, and feedback was provided to the teams on a regular basis. Enumerators were monitored for rushing, skipped questions, and other quality indicators. Given the sensitive nature of the survey, enumerators were also monitored for recording unusually high

or low support for particular candidates, organizations, and policies. The surveys were also spatially analyzed to ensure the teams were operating in the correct locations. Technical issues with the GPS hardware, however, prevented many of the surveys from being analyzed in this way. When this problem was discovered, survey supervisors were asked to record photos of each enumeration area as evidence that the surveys were conducted in the proper locations. Over the course of the survey implementation, a few enumerators were flagged for rushing and other quality indicators. These quality issues affected less than 2% of the surveys, and the results do not substantively change when these surveys are excluded from the analysis.


DEMOGRAPHICS

Our sample has the following characteristics.

Number of people surveyed: The sample was drawn using the 2012 database projection of the 1984 census, the last nationwide census. This is the same database used by the Congolese National Institute for Statistics, a government agency, and was used for the National Household Survey in 2012 and for the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) of 2010.

The sample produces a greater proportion of respondents from the former Bandundu province (Kwilu, Kwango, and Mai-Ndombe) and a lower proportion from Kinshasa than either the 2006 or the 2011 elections. For the sake of comparison, we calculated a reweighted version of the results for the question “Who would you vote for if elections are held in 2016?”, using the provincial proportions of the 2006 elections (using the old 11 provinces)—you can find this in Annex A. There was no significant change with regards to that question, and we do not believe it would significantly alter the results of most other questions.

FIGURE 36 | NUMBER OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED BY PROVINCE



CHARACTERISTICS OF SAMPLED POPULATION:

The sample corresponds broadly to what we know about Congolese demographics. In 2012, the World Bank estimated that around 63% of Congolese earned less than \$1.25 a day.²⁶ We used a round figure of \$400/year (400,000 Congolese francs or \$1.09/day) to make it easier for respondents to estimate their income. Around 57% of our sample fell under that threshold. Fifty-two percent of households in our sample had mobile phones; the DHS conducted in 2013 found that 39% of households had phones.³⁷

Fifty-five percent of our sample had access to water within a twenty minute walk; the DHS survey found that 49% had access to water within a thirty minute walk. Nineteen percent of our sample had access to electricity, compared with 14% in the DHS sample.

Men make up approximately 55% of the survey sample. This slight gender imbalance could result from men being more likely to be home at the time of the survey or more likely to volunteer or insist on being the person interviewed.

Thirty percent of our sample are of the Catholic faith, 24,8% are Protestant, 25,6% born-again Christians, and 7,1% Kimbanguists. This corresponds broadly to the DHS data, which are: 29,7%; 26,8%; 37,2%; and 2,7% respectively, within our 5% margin of error.

FIGURE 37 | CHARACTERISTICS OF POLLED POPULATION³⁸




FIGURE 38 | RELIGION OF POLLED POPULATION





FIGURE 39 | PERCENTAGE OF HOUSEHOLDS OWNING THESE ITEMS



ANNEX A

Reweighting of question: for whom would you vote if elections were held by the end of the year?

USING THE WEIGHTS FROM PROJECTIONS BASED ON THE 1984 CENSUS:

CANDIDATE	PERCENT
KENGO	1.0
GIZENGA	2.4
KABILA	7.8
KAMERHE	7.5
KAMITATU	1.7
KATUMBI	33.3
LEMBE	2.6
MATUNGULU	1.1
PONYO	1.8
TSHISEKEDI	18.0
Other	10.6
Refuse to Answer	5.1
Undecided	7.0

USING THE WEIGHTS OF THE 2006 ELECTIONS:

CANDIDATE	PERCENT
KENGO	1.0
GIZENGA	1.8
KABILA	7.9
KAMERHE	7.8
KAMITATU	1.3
KATUMBI	34.3
LEMBE	2.8
MATUNGULU	1.0
PONYO	1.7
TSHISEKEDI	17.7
Other	10.3
Refuse to Answer	5.4
Undecided	7.0

ENDNOTES

¹The question was: “Pour qui voteriez-vous si les élections présidentielles se tiendraient à temps, avant la fin de l’année?” Respondents were allowed to provide any name they wanted and were only read the following list of potential candidates if they could not come up with a name: Evariste Boshab, Etienne Tshisekedi, Vital Kamerhe, Matata Ponyo, Olive Lembe, Aubin Minaku, Martin Fayulu, Mbuyamu Matungulu, Denis Mukwege, Joseph Kabila, Moise Katumbi, Antoine Gizenga, and Mbusa Nyamwisi.

²That includes people who said they would vote for Kenga wa Dondo (1%) and Antoine Gizenga (2,4%), who are perceived as unreliable allies by many in the presidential coalition. Support for them would not necessarily translate into support for another candidate appointed by Kabila.

³In Kinshasa, for example, the number of registered voters only grew 11% between 2006 and 2011, which was about half the estimated growth rate of the population there during that period. In Maniema, in contrast, the population grew by 39% and in Katanga by 32%.

⁴Rapport sur l’opération de fiabilisation du fichier électoral et de stabilisation de la cartographie électorale, Organisation internationale de la francophonie, 2015. The report estimated that 8,5 million new voters had not been registered, but that 1,5 million of these may have been fraudulently registered while they were still minors in the 2011 exercise.

⁵Barometre politique, BERCI, 2015.

⁶Kabila also appears to be popular in Sankuru province, although we were only able to carry out 40% of the interviews required by our sample due to security problems encountered by our local team.

⁷For example, the head of the Église du Christ au Congo (ECC), Msgr Marini Bodho, has argued that the constitution can be changed to allow the president to run for a third, while Muslim leaders are also seen as close to President Kabila. In contrast, the Catholic Church has been very critical of Kabila.

⁸Kamerhe was particularly popular in Mongala, the province of origin of Jean-Bertrand Ewanga, the secretary-general of his Union pour la nation congolaise (UNC) political party. However, the poll was conducted in Mongala just before Ewanga publicly fell out with Kamerhe on August 30, 2016 over his participation in the national dialogue.

⁹The respective questions were: Avez-vous confiance en la CENI pour mener à bien des élections libres et équitables ? and Quelle est votre opinion de Corneille NANGAA, le nouveau président de la CENI ?

¹⁰The question was: Avez-vous l’intention de voter aux prochaines élections présidentielles, législatives et locales qui se tiendront prochainement ?

¹¹The question was: Il y aura bientôt des élections locales, provinciales et nationales au Congo. Avec laquelle de ces affirmations êtes-vous en accord ? Respondents could then choose between: Il est bon de retarder les élections présidentielles et législatives en vue de tenir des élections locales d’abord parce qu’il est important que celles-ci aient lieu en premier; Les élections présidentielles et parlementaires devraient avoir lieu à temps, même si cela signifie que les élections locales viendront plus tard ; Il relève au gouvernement de décider de la meilleure façon de procéder.

¹²The question was: La constitution congolaise nécessite que le président Joseph Kabila se retire à la fin de son second mandat en 2016. Êtes-vous en faveur d’une révision constitutionnelle qui permettrait à Joseph Kabila de briguer un autre mandat en tant que président ?

¹³Kasai was an outlier in this regard, with 42,5% support for changing the constitution.

¹⁴Si les élections nationales ne se tiennent pas avant la fin de 2016, est-ce que Président Joseph Kabila doit démissionner ou il peut rester jusqu'à ce que les élections se tiennent ?

¹⁵The question was: En mai 2015 le Président Kabila a commencé des consultations avec la classe politique et la société civile en vue de préparer un dialogue politique. Avec lequel des énoncés suivants êtes-vous d'accord ? Respondents were then asked to agree or disagree with the following statement: L'opposition et la société civile doivent participer à un tel dialogue pour apaiser le climat politique et trouver des solutions aux problèmes de la nation.

¹⁶The question was: En avril 2016, l'ancien premier Ministre du Togo a été nommé, comme facilitateur du Dialogue Global en vue de régler les problèmes liés aux prochaines élections en RDC, avez-vous confiance en lui?

¹⁷En général pendant les élections, parmi les propositions suivantes quel est le facteur qui influence le plus le choix le vote du candidat? Vous pouvez choisir jusqu'à 3 propositions. Respondents could then choose among the following list:

¹⁷La personnalité/charisme du candidat

La plateforme ou parti politique/programme du candidat

Le candidat qui a le pouvoir

Le candidat de ma tribu/de mon ethnie

Le candidat qui aide/rend service à ma famille/tribu/ethnie

Le candidat qui rend service à la communauté locale

Le candidat qui n'est pas corrompu

Le candidat auquel ma famille ou mes amis voterons

Le candidat qui a beaucoup d'argent/peut distribuer de l'argent et des biens à la population

Un candidat qui se préoccupe des gens comme moi

¹⁸The question was: Avez-vous déjà participé à un mouvement de contestation sociale dans les cinq années passées ? Cela pourrait être une marche de protestation, une grève, ou une manifestation politique.

¹⁹The question was: Si vous pensiez que les élections nationales prochaines seraient truquées ou reportées, prendriez-vous part à une manifestation ?

²⁰The question was: Lors des 12 derniers mois vous vous êtes engagés dans les associations suivantes... ?

²¹The respective questions were: Est-ce qu'une femme peut concourir aux élections ? Si oui, est-ce que vous pensez qu'on devrait s'assurer que la moitié des candidats aux élections soient des femmes ? Jusqu'à quel point est-ce que vous soutenez les femmes qui servent l'État dans les postes suivants ?

²²The question was: À quel point vous sentez-vous en sécurité ou en danger en marchant seul(e) dans votre quartier/village le jour ou la nuit ? Responses were then distinguished by whether they felt safe at day and/or night.

²³The respective questions were: A votre avis, la justice est-elle indépendante en RDC ? Estimez-vous que tous les citoyens congolais sont-ils égaux devant la loi ? Estimez-vous l'accès à la justice soit possible pour tous les congolais ?

²⁴The respective questions were: Êtes-vous favorable à la création d'un tribunal congolais pour juger les criminels de guerre? Si oui, pensez-vous que des procureurs et juges étrangers devraient faire partie de ce tribunal?

²⁵The question was: Le Congo fait face à de nombreux défis importants, et le gouvernement ne peut pas tous les surmonter en même temps. Quelle devrait être la première priorité du gouvernement congolais?

²⁶The question was: Le gouvernement a construit un grand parc agricole dans Bukanga Lonzo, dans la province de Bandundu, pour aider à promouvoir l'agriculture congolaise et fournir Kinshasa avec de la nourriture. Les critiques ont déclaré que le projet est trop coûteux et que plus d'accent devrait être mis sur la promotion des petits agriculteurs. Avec lequel des énoncés suivants êtes-vous en accord:

²⁷The Banyamulenge community is only found in the Congo, while Hutu and Tutsi also live in Rwanda and Burundi.

²⁸The question was: Nous allons vous citer une série d’assertions, dites-nous oui ou non si vous êtes d’accord avec elles ? Les Banyamulenge sont des congolais ; il y a des Hutu qui sont congolais ; il y a des Tutsis qui sont congolais; toute personne dont la famille a habité au Congo depuis avant 1960 est congolais.

²⁹Pierre Englebert and Emmanuel Kasongo show that provinces only retrocede around 3% of their revenues to local administrations instead of the constitutionally required 40%. This means that local administration is almost entirely reliant on modest taxes levied on trade. Pierre Englebert and Emmanuel Kasongo, “Misguided and misdiagnosed: The failure of decentralization reforms in the DR Congo,” *African Studies Review*, 59.1 (2016), 5-32.

³⁰The question was: Étiez-vous favorable ou pas à mise en place effectives des 26 provinces à partir des 11, comme demandé par la constitution, communément appelé découpage ?

³¹The question was: Les Nations Unies au Congo, la MONUSCO, comptait encore il y a quelques mois plus de 20.000 soldats. Avec lequel des énoncés suivants êtes-vous en accord : La MONUSCO fait un travail important en RDC et doit rester.

La MONUSCO doit revoir son effectif à la baisse.

La MONUSCO ne contribue pas grande chose à la sécurité ou stabilité du pays et doit quitter

³²The question was: Pensez-vous que la MONUSCO fait un bon travail de protection des civils?

³³The question was: La MONUSCO a le mandat de protéger les civils en danger imminent. Dans le passé, elle a hésité à mener des opérations militaires contre les groupes armés sans l’armée congolaise à ses côtés. Pensez-vous que la MONUSCO devrait attaquer les groupes armés sans attendre l’approbation de l’armée congolaise ?

³⁴The question was: Êtes-vous d’accord avec l’énoncé suivant : «Le Congo serait mieux sans l’aide étrangère”, sans les ONGS Humanitaires, et ou sans les investissements étrangers?

³⁵We used the probability proportional to size (PPS) sampling technique whereas the probability that a particular sampling unit will be chosen in the sample is proportional to some known variable, such as in our case, the population size of the province. It was in fact a multi-stage cluster (or stratified) sampling with 3 clusters in rural area and two clusters in urban area. Using the 2012 INS data based, in the rural area, the first cluster was the “sector/chefferie”, the second cluster was “the groupement” and the third cluster the “village”. In the urban area the first cluster was the “commune”, the second cluster was the “quartier”. Also be called “unequal probability sampling”, this sampling technique it increases the odds that a subject will be chosen in the sample based on its size, and reduces standard error and bias by increasing the likelihood that a sampling unit from a larger “province “will be chosen over a sampling unit from a smaller “province”. This method was used to avoid having to do weighting later in the process.

³⁶The World Bank, Poverty Working Group, 2012. <http://data.worldbank.org/country/congo-dem-rep>

³⁷Democratic Republic of Congo Demographic and Health Survey 2013-2014, Ministère du Plan et Suivi de la Mise en Oeuvre de la Révolution de la Modernité, Ministère de la Santé Publique, Kinshasa, RD Congo et MESURE DHS, ICF International.

³⁸Revenue is annual.

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